CONSTITUTIONAL
ASSESSMENTS

LAW-FIFTH AMENDMENT-SURTAXES

IMPOSED

AND

BY NEW JERSEY'S FAIR AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE REFORM ACT Do NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS OR
CONSTITUTE A TAKING WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION--State

Farm v. State of New Jersey, 124 N.J. 32, 590 A.2d 191 (1991).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution'
prohibits the deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, 2 and proscribes the taking of private property for
I U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall...
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
2 Id. See generally, LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8, at
427-455 (1978). Implied limits on governmental authority evolved from the natural law tradition of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Id. § 8-1, at 427. This
tradition harmonized individual liberties with governmental entitlement by relegating each to a specific sphere of authority, beyond which neither could extend. Id.
Inherent limitations on governmental authority were recognized as early as 1798 by
Justice Chase who opined that "a law that 'takes property from A and gives it to
B'... would exceed the proper authority of government and would thus be invalid." Id. § 8-1, at 428 (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)).
In the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873), Justice Miller, writing for a
five to four majority, declined to employ the express due process limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a Louisiana law giving a corporation a private
monopoly on the maintenance of New Orleans stockyards and slaughterhouses.
TRIBE, supra, § 8-1, at 430. Instead, Justice Miller narrowly construed the Fourteenth Amendment and upheld the legislated monopoly. Id. In separate dissenting
opinions, however, Justices Field and Bradley contended that the Fourteenth
Amendment empowered the federal government to protect certain basic rights, including the free pursuit of an occupation, from abridgement by the states. Id.
Scrutiny of state legislation and protection of substantive due process rights
increased in several decisions following the Slaughter-House Cases. Id. § 8-1, at
432-33. For example, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876), the Court analyzed the scope of state power to regulate and noted that prior to the Fourteenth
Amendment, state usage and price regulation of private property did not violate
due process per se. TRIBE, supra, § 8-1, at 433. The Court asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not alter that principle but explicitly prohibited state regulation that deprived citizens of due process. Id. The Munn Court cautioned that
when public interest was not involved "what is reasonable must be ascertained judicially." Id. at 433; see also infra notes 44-51 and accompanying text for further discussion of Munn. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court
abandoned the implied limitations analysis and invalidated a Louisiana statute restricting marine insurance contracts as exceeding the state's power to regulate and
violating specific guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. TRIBE, supra, § 8-1, at
434. The Court further explained the distinct powers of the government and its
citizens in Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1874), declaring that
" '[t]here are rights in every free government beyond the control of the State.' "
TRIBE, supra, § 8-1, at 431.
In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court denounced property
regulations purportedly designed to protect public welfare. TRIBE, supra, § 8-1, at
439. The Court invalidated a New York law limiting bakery worker hours as unduly

1529

1530

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1529

public use without just compensation.' These Fifth Amendment
precepts, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,4 have been used by courts to delineate the proper scope of
restrictive and beyond the state's police power, exemplifying the prevailing judicial
intolerance for statutes viewed as attempts to legislatively re-allocate economic
power. Id. § 8-1, at 437.
Finally, in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), the Court delineated the
modem standards for statutory validity under substantive due process analysis. Id.
Upholding a New York law that set minimum milk prices, the Nebbia Court held that
due process required only that a law be substantially related to the end sought and
not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 525; see also infra, note 52-57 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Court's holding; see also JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Ch. 13, 425 2d ed. 1983) (providing an expansive analysis of substantive due process); Bruce N. Morton,John Locke, Robert Bork, NaturalRights and the
Interpretationof the Constitution, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 709 (1992) (tracing the development of natural law philosophy and the proper balance between individual rights
and majoritarian government restrictions); Herbert Hovenkamp, The PoliticalEconomy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 380 (1988) (tracing the economic
influences on judicial philosophies regarding substantive due process); Richard S.
Myers, The End of Substantive Due Process? 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 558 (1988)
(analyzing current due process jurisprudence and the outlook for the future).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a discussion of the constitutional ban on takings,
see generally TRIBE, supra note 2, §§ 9-2 to 9-4, at 457-65. The common law of takings did not absolutely proscribe governmental taking of private property; rather, it
merely required that such taking not serve a private end. Id. § 9-2, at 457. Legislative taking powers, as well as regulation and taxation powers, could only be exercised to advance an overriding public purpose. Id. The Supreme Court
acknowledged this principle for the first time in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896), holding that despite compensation, takings for a private purpose violated Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees. TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 9-2, at 457-58 n.3.
The law of takings was further distilled in a series of cases involving privately
owned land. Id. § 8-5, at 444. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922), the Supreme Court struck down a statute that proscribed certain mining
operations, thereby destroying property rights without providing compensation.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 8-5, at 444. In Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), however, the Court upheld a statute that mandated the destruction without compensation of privately-owned infected trees because of the overriding public benefit.
TRIBE, supra note 2, § 8-5, at 445.
Austere governmental regulations of private property have also been the subject of takings claims where the regulations substantially impaired the property
value. Id. § 9-3, at 460. The Court, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926), upheld a local zoning ordinance which closed down a fertilizer
company, despite the uncompensated diminution in property values. TRIBE, supra
note 2, § 9-3, at 461-62. Takings jurisprudence, however, is not confined to the
real property arena. See infra note 5 (cases in diverse areas involving private property affected by government regulation); see also Frank R. Strong, On Placing Property
Due Process Center Stage in Takings Jurisprudence, 49 OIo ST. L. J. 591, 593 (1988)
(focusing on Pennsylvania Coal and noting that the takings clause merely mandated
government compensation for a taking; due process determined whether a taking
had in fact occurred).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in
pertinent part:
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government regulation in diverse areas. 5 The Due Process
Clause mandates that governmental regulation of private industry must be substantially related to the object sought and that
industry participants
be guaranteed an adequate rate of return on
6
investments.
their
In this arena, particularly troublesome cases have involved
attempts to quantify an adequate rate of return with regard to
governmental rate or price control in a particular industry.7 The
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The Bill of Rights was held to be inapplicable to state action in the pre-Civil
War era. NOWAK, supra note 2, Ch. 13, § V, at 452 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32
U.S. 243 (1833)). Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court initially rejected assertions that the Bill of Rights was applicable to state and
local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Nonetheless, individual
rights enjoyed protection under the Court's broad interpretation of the Due Process Clause, which allowed it to safeguard basic freedoms and natural law rights
without reference to specific Constitutional provisions. Id.
A number of competing views emerged, including Justice Black's proffer that
the entire Bill of Rights should be applied directly to the states. Id. Ch. 13, § V at
454. Alternatively,Justice Frankfurter posited that the concept of "liberty" did not
rely on specific Bill of Rights guarantees and should be judicially defined. Id. At
present, the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates nearly all of the Bill of Rights
guarantees, particularly those considered " 'fundamental to the American scheme
of justice.'" Id. Ch. 13, § V at 455 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
148-49 (1968)). Furthermore, provisions incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment are applied consistently, whether the actor is a local, state or federal government. Id. Ch.13, § V at 456-57. See also William Cohen,Justices Black and Douglas and
the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula ":Some Fragments of Intellectual History, 20 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 381, 382 (1987) (analyzing the incorporation doctrine in light of
natural law concepts).
5 See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 301 (1989) (state regulatory scheme for electrical generating facilities); Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 107 (1978) (historical landmark designation restricting exercise of property rights); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747,
754 (1968) (federal regulation of natural gas rates); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 594 (1944) (federal rate order fixing natural gas prices); Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 379 (1926) (municipal zoning ordinance);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 404 (1915) (municipal ordinance limiting
land use).
6 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); see also infra notes 52-57 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Court's holding in Nebbia.
7 See, e.g., Guaranty Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Gates, 916 F.2d 506 (1990) (auto insurance
rate scheme precluding relief to insurers who were not threatened with insolvency
held unconstitutional); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247 (1989) (provisions placing undue restriction on rate relief severed from auto insurance rate
regulations); Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 210, 394 A.2d 65, 70
(1978) (examining a rent control ordinance, the court noted that "[s]atisfactory
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New Jersey auto insurance industry provides a contemporary
gridiron for the divisive struggle to determine the proper ambit
of legislative action. 8
In State Farm v. State,9 the New Jersey Supreme Court entered this fray and considered whether surtaxes and assessments
levied by the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act (Reform
Act) precluded auto insurance companies from receiving an adequate rate of return.'0 After distilling a body of nebulous background material, the court voiced concerns about the actual
effectiveness of the Act." Nonetheless, the court deferred to the
legislature and determined that because the prohibitions on rate
increases were not absolute, the Reform Act did not work an un2
constitutional taking or violate due process.'
SALIENT FACTS

Over the last decade, New Jersey has grappled unremittingly
with the chronic, vexing problem of supplying automobile insurance to high-risk drivers.' 3 Before 1983, high-risk drivers unable
formulations of just and reasonable return ...have proven to be elusive") appeal
dismissed, 440 U.S. 978 (1979).
8 See State Farm v. State, 124 N.J. 32, 590 A.2d 191 (1991). New Jersey is
merely the most recent jurisdiction in which the auto insurance battle has been
waged; both California and Nevada hosted challenges to legislation regulating auto
insurance rates. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text for analysis of the
statutes in those jurisdictions.
9 124 N.J. 32, 590 A.2d 191 (1991).
10 Id. at 38, 590 A.2d at 194. In addition to the takings and due process claims,
the court briefly considered a number of other constitutional challenges to the Reform Act's validity. Id. at 64-66, 590 A.2d at 207-09; see infra notes 136-43 and
accompanying text for a discussion of those issues.
I ' Id. at 62, 590 A.2d at 207. Particularly, the court expressed concern that the
language of the rate increase provisions allowed but did not require the Insurance
Commissioner to order rate relief for insurers denied an adequate rate of return.
Id. While acknowledging the complexity of the rate increase filing process and the
potential for unreasonable delays, the court presumed that rate relief would be
available in a timely fashion. Id. at 62-63, 590 A.2d at 207.
12 Id. at 61-62, 590 A.2d at 206. In rendering this decision, the court divined the
legislative intent to protect insurers against a denial of a fair rate of return caused
by surcharges and assessments. Id. at 61, 590 A.2d at 206. The court added that
even if this interpretation was questionable, the court would approve it to preclude
an unconstitutional construction of the statute. Id.
13 Id. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195. "High-Risk Driver" is not defined in theJUA definitions section. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-3 (West 1985). High-risk drivers, as well
as other drivers unable to secure auto insurance, comprise the "Residual Market"
which necessitated the loathsome Residual Market Equalization Charge (RMEC).
See id. at 41-42, 590 A.2d at 196; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-8(d) (West 1985). These
charges reached a highwater mark of $222 for each car owned. See Joseph F. Sullivan, Florio's Auto Insurance Law Upheld, N.Y. TiMES, May 17, 1991, at B2; see also
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to secure coverage in the voluntary market were allocated to insurance carriers through the Assigned Risk Plan.' 4 The Assigned
Risk Plan yielded, in 1983, to the Automobile Full Insurance
Availability Act,' 5 which created the Joint Underwriting Association (JUA). 6
All automobile insurers licensed in New Jersey were brought
under the aegis of the JUA,' 7 with designated "servicing carriers" managing administrative details and issuing insurance policies to qualified applicants.1 8 Foreseeing that the revenues
Stephen Barr, Auto Insurance: Legal Wrangling, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 1991, § 12NJ,
at 1 (predicting that elimination of surcharges will result only in shifting of costs,
not reduced rates).
14 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195. This plan empowered the Commissioner of Insurance to apportion coverage of high risk drivers among all auto
insurance carriers operating in New Jersey. Id.
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:30E-1 to -24 (West 1985).
16 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195. Section 17:30E-2 of the Automobile Full Insurance Availability Act provided:
The purpose of this act is to assure to the New Jersey insurance consumer full access to automobile insurance through normal market
outlets at standard market rates, to encourage the use of available
market facilities, to provide automobile insurance for qualified applicants who cannot otherwise obtain such insurance through a full automobile insurance underwriting association, and to require that
companies be made whole for losses in excess of regulated rates on all
risks not voluntarily written by providing procedures for the spreading and recoupment of losses based on actual experience.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-2 (West 1985).
Thus, theJUA was created to match New Jersey drivers with insurance carriers
and to make auto insurance available to drivers otherwise unable to secure insurance. State Farm, 124 N.J. at 41, 590 A.2d at 195. Accordingly, high risk drivers
would obtain auto insurance at standard market rates and through regular market
outlets. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-2 (West 1985). The plan also promoted the use
of the existing market structure. Id.
17 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 41, 590 A.2d at 195. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-4
(West 1985). All insurers were constrained to abide by a Plan of Operation, subsequently adopted by the association's governing Board of Directors. State Farm 124
N.J. at 41, 590 A.2d at 195. Although the Commissioner of Insurance retained
ultimate authority to overrule board actions potentially incongruous with state regulations, the Board of Directors, primarily comprised of representatives from insurance carriers, brokers, and agents, managed theJUA. Id. at 41, 590 A.2d at 196.
Recognizing the inequity of requiring insurance carriers to involuntarily assume certain risks, the Act provided that all companies would be indemnified for
losses exceeding regulated rates incurred on policies written pursuant to this Act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-2 (West 1985).
18 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 41, 590 A.2d at 196. Section 17:30E-7 empowered the
JUA to authorize "servicing carriers" to act as agents of the association. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:30E-7(e) (West 1985). TheJUA invited insurers to apply for the "servicing carrier" designation. State Farm, 124 N.J. at 41, 590 A.2d at 196. All "servicing carriers" collected premiums and issued coverage and, in return were
compensated for these services by the JUA. Id.
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generated by insuring high risk drivers at voluntary market rates
would not offset the liabilities on claims, JUA income was supplemented by funds from various external sources.' 9
Despite the supplemental income and numerous other provisions intended to safeguard the JUA's operational solvency,2 °
the system became overburdened. 2' Substantial surcharges, imposed on policy holders from 1988 to 1990, failed to remedy the
JUA's fiscal woes, as liabilities of the association outstripped revenues. 2 2 By 1990, the exorbitant JUA debt became a priority of
19 Id. at 41-42, 590 A.2d at 196. In addition to net premiums collected by the
JUA, income was to be derived from any accident surcharge system adopted by the
association, portions of the Division of Motor Vehicles surcharges for drunk driving
and other moving violations, and the residual market equalization charges. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-8 (West 1985). "Residual market equalization charges"
(RMEC's) (alternatively labelled flat charges, capitation fees, or policy constants)
were surcharges placed on basic policy rates intended to bridge the deficit between
the costs of operating the JUA and the other collective sources of income, so that
the association would operate on a break even basis. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-3(o)
(West 1985). The RMEC's were subject to change in response to, and in order to
preserve, the financial vitality of the JUA. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-8(b) (West
1985).
20 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30E-7 (West 1985). In addition to supplemental income
sources, the JUA also provided numerous procedural safeguards, including:
§ 17:30E-7(d) (association shall take steps necessary to prevent payment of improper claims); § 17:30E-7(g) (association shall introduce standards for review of
producer and servicing carrier operating practices and eliminate inadequate practices); § 17:30E-7(k) (association shall establish regulatory bylaws regarding internal affairs); § 17:30E-7(o) (association shall scrutinize complaints concerning
producer conduct and take action when necessary); § 17:30E-7(p) (association shall
evaluate operations of serving carriers and charge servicing carriers forJUA efforts
to improve inadequate practices); § 17:30E-7(s) (association shall act as needed to
achieve the goals of the Act). Id.
21 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196. Unable to secure coverage in the
voluntary market, hordes of drivers were corralled into the JUA, so that by 1988
over 50% of New Jersey drivers were compelled to seek coverage through theJUA.
Id. The ultimate absurdity of the JUA system was manifest by the fact that an insurer could realize a greater profit by settling a claim filed by one of its own policy
holders for a higher amount. Wayne King, New Jersey Cuts Cost of Driving, NEW YoRK
TIMES, April 1, 1991, at BI. Because the money to pay the claim came from aJUA
pool rather than directly from the insurer, and because the insurer received a percentage of each claim settled, insurers had an incentive to settle claims at inflated
amounts, thereby increasing their own profits and draining JUA funds. Id.
22 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196. Prior to adoption of the Fair
Automobile Insurance Reform Act, the JUA was described as "a bureaucratic
nightmare" and "a system choked by its own red tape." Suzanne Riss, For its Closing
Act, JUA Goes From Bad to Worse; Plaintiffs' Lawyers Cite Mounting Delays and Lower Settlements, N.J.L.J., April 12, 1990, at 3.
The exact magnitude of the JUA debt was the subject of continuing speculation; an October 1991 estimate surmised that the debt would eventually reach $3.4
billion, and that New Jersey drivers would be paying off this debt well into 1996.
Joe Donohue, Study Predicts DeficitforAuto Insurance Pool, THE STAR-LEDGER, October
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the government. 2 s
Responding to this mounting problem, in March 1990, the
legislature adopted the Fair Automobile Insurance Reform Act
(Reform Act). 24 The primary objectives of the Reform Act included effectuating a general reduction of car insurance costs,
depopulating and dissolving the JUA, and establishing a means
of eradicating the mammoth JUA debt. 25 The Reform Act addressed the JUA deficit, by creating a special fund within the
State Treasury, the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Guaranty
Fund (Auto Fund), for the collection and disbursement of monies
dedicated exclusively to satisfying the debt.26 Section 74 of the
Reform Act imposed large assessments on the insurance compa20, 1991, at 1,2; see also King, supra note 21, at BI (detailing the over $3 million
dollar JUA debt that had accumulated by the time the legislature voted to abolish
the association).
23 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196; see also Barr, supra note 13, at 1
("For Mr. Florio, 'junk the J.U.A.' was a key campaign pledge.")
24 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B-1
to -63 (West Supp. 1991) for text of the Act.
25 State Farm, 124 at 42, 590 A.2d at 196. The Act proclaimed that as of October
1990, the JUA would discontinue writing and renewing policies. Id. Furthermore,
as part of the depopulation of theJUA, drivers would be grouped into one of three
classifications, with policy rates corresponding to the estimated risk. Id. at 42-43,
590 A.2d at 196. Under these new categories, "high-risk drivers," comprising approximately 10% of the NewJersey market, were placed in a re-animated AssignedRisk Plan. Id. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196. Private carriers insured "non-standard risk
drivers," which comprised 15% of the market, at rates up to 135% of standard risk
drivers. Id. at 42-43, 590 A.2d 196. The remainder of the market, classified as
"standard risk drivers," were to be covered in the voluntary market, at prevailing
rates. Id. at 43, 590 A.2d 196. "High-risk" drivers would no longer be subsidized by
the rest of the market because the higher rates assessed on their policies would be
sufficient to indemnify the liabilities these drivers would incur. Id.
26 Id. at 43, 590 A.2d at 196-97. The Auto Fund received income from sources
previously allocated to the JUA, including surcharges on drivers for drunk driving
convictions and other driving infractions. Id. at 43, 590 A.2d at 197.
The Reform Act also created several additional sources of revenue for the
Auto Fund through increased automobile registration fees and the imposition of
assessments on doctors, lawyers, and auto body repair shops. Id. These assessments, intended to net approximately $6 million, were challenged on separation of
powers, equal protection, and substantive due process grounds, and were subsequently upheld. N.J. State Bar Ass'n v. Berman, 11 N.J. Tax 433, 437 (1991); see also
Jeffrey Kanige, Court Upholds JUA-Bailout Fees on Lawyers, MDs; State Bar, Medical
Groups to Appeal Constitutional Issues N.J.L.J., January 24, 1991, at 3 (discussing the
Berman holding).
The sources of income for the JUA bailout central to State Farm's complaint
were the assessments and surtaxes on insurance carriers in New Jersey. State Farm,
124 N.J. at 43, 590 A.2d at 197; see also Reform Act, §§ 63 to 68, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:33B-58 to -63 (West Supp. 1991) (imposing additional fees); § 74, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 17:30A-a(9)-(10) (West Supp. 1991) (granting the powers to levy assessments); § 76, N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:33B-49 (West Supp. 1991) (imposing surtaxes).

1536

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1529

nies to be collected by the Property Liability Insurance Guaranty
Association (PLIGA).2 7 Section 75 explicitly prohibited insurers
from recouping assessments via "passthroughs" or surcharges
on policy holders.2 8
In addition to the section 74 assessments, section 76 of the
Reform Act levied a surtax on insurers to alleviate the JUA
debt. 29 Section 78 precluded insurance carriers from passing
State Farm, 124 N.J. at 43, 590 A.2d at 197. PLIGA was codified in N.J. STAT.
§ 17:30A-6 and § 17:30A-8(a) (referred to in State Farm as Section 74), which
delineated the association's powers, providing that PLIGA shall:
(9) Assess member insurers in amounts necessary to make loans
pursuant to paragraph (10) of this subsection. Estimated assessments
of each member insurer shall be in the proportion that the net direct
written premiums of the member insurer for the calendar year preceding the assessment bears to the net direct written premiums of all
member insurers for the calendar year preceding the assessment with
actual assessments adjusted in the succeeding year based on the proportion that the insurer's net direct written premiums in the year of
assessment bears to the net direct written premiums of all member
insurers for that year.
(10) Make loans in the amount of $160 million per calendar year,
beginning in calendar year 1990, to the New Jersey Automobile Insurance Guaranty Fund created pursuant to section 23 of P.L. 1990, c. 8
(C. 17:33B-5), except that no loan shall be made pursuant to this paragraph after December 31, 1997.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-8(a)(9)-(10) (West Supp. 1991).
Thus, assessments were to be collected by PLIGA, deposited into the Auto
Fund, and dedicated solely to the objective of eliminating the JUA deficit. State
Farm, 124 N.J. at 43, 590 A.2d at 197. PLIGA was originally established in 1974 to
levy assessments on property-casualty insurers in New Jersey for the payment of
claims filed against insolvent carriers. Id. Designated as "loans" under the Reform
Act, these assessments were intended to produce yearly revenues of $160 million
for the period of 1990 to 1997. Id. at 44, 590 A.2d at 197. In 1990, the assessments
totalled 2.7% of property-casualty insurer net premiums. Id.
28 Id. Section 75 stated: "No member insurer shall impose a surcharge on the
premiums of any policy to recoup assessments paid pursuant to paragraph (9) of
subsection (a) of section 8 of P.L. 1974, c. 17 (C. 17:30A-8)." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:30A-16b (West Supp. 1991).
Insurers have invariably been authorized to pass through, in one form or another, the cost of PLIGA insolvency assessments to policyholders. State Farm, 124
N.J. at 44, 590 A.2d at 197. Prior to 1979, insolvency assessments were passed on
to policyholders in the form of rate increases. Id. Subsequent legislation authorized direct surcharges on policy premiums, a procedure still authorized for recoupment of insolvency assessments. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:30A-16a). The
Reform Act explicitly proscribed surcharges designed to recover the cost of assessments made to fund the JUA bailout. Id.
29 Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:33B-49). The statute provided, in pertinent
part:
In addition to the tax on net premiums paid pursuant to section 1 of
P.L. 1945, c. 132 (C.54:18A-1), each taxpayer under that section shall
pay to the Director of the Division of Taxation an annual surtax at a
rate of 5%, or a rate adjusted pursuant to section 77 (section 17:33B27
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through the expense of these surtaxes to policy holders, and empowered the Insurance Commissioner to protect consumers from
shouldering any of the surtax burden. 0
Although these provisions seem to preclude insurers from
obtaining rate relief by passing costs on to policy holders, section
2g3 granted the Commissioner of Insurance implicit authority to
guarantee all insurers an adequate rate of return. 2 The proper
harmonization of section 75, section 78 and section 2g provided
33
the gravamen of the dispute between insurers and the State.
In May 1990, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (State Farm) filed suit in New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division, attacking the facial constitutionality of the Reform Act, characterizing it as a confiscatory taking and a violation
of due process.3 4 The court granted State Farm's motion for a
50) of this 1990 amendatory and supplementary act, on all taxable
premiums collected in this State, except premiums collected by the
New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association created pursuant to section 16 of P.L. 1983, c. 65 (C.17:30E-4), and premiums collected by the market Transition Facility created pursuant to
section 88 of P.L. 1990, c. 8 (C.17:33B-11), in calendar years 1990,
1991 and 1992 for contracts of automobile insurance, notwithstanding section 6 of P.L. 1945, c. 132 (C.54:18A-6). The surtax shall be
administered pursuant to the provision of P.L. 1945, c. 132
(C.54:18A-1 et seq.), except that if any provision of that act is in conflict with a specific provision of this 1990 amendatory and supplementary act, the provision or provisions of this 1990 amendatory and
supplementary act shall govern.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B-49(a) (West Supp. 1991).
The initial surtax rate was set at five percent of insurer's net premiums. State
Farm, 124 N.J. at 44, 590 A.2d at 197. The surtax was intended to net $300 million
dollars during 1990-1992. Id. The Director of the Division of Taxation, however,
was vested with authority to adjust surtax rates to ensure that total revenues approached, but did not exceed, the target amount of $300 million. Id. (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. 17:33B-50).
30 Id. at 45, 590 A. 2d at 197. Section 78 stated that "[tlhe Commissioner of
Insurance shall take such action as is necessary to ensure that private passenger
automobile insurance policyholders shall not pay for the surtax imposed pursuant
to section 76." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:33B-51).
31 N.J. STAT. ANN. 17:33B-2g (West Supp. 1991). This section declared: "To
provide a healthy and competitive automobile insurance system in this State, automobile insurers are entitled to earn an adequate rate of return through the
ratemaking process." Id.
32 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 54, 590 A.2d at 202; see infra note 153 and accompanying text for a comprehensive analysis of the impact of § 2 g.
33 Id. at 51-52, 590 A.2d at 201. The court noted that the factors in this constitutional calculus included examination of the legislative history, scrutiny of the statutory language, and deference to the administrative interpretation of the Reform
Act. Id.
34 Id. at 38-39, 590 A.2d at 194. Although the main thrust of this attack was a
takings and due process challenge, the insurers' raised a number of other claims,
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preliminary injunction and permitted the insurers to pay the statutory assessments and surtaxes to the court rather than the
State. 5
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, granted
the State's motions for a stay of the preliminary injunction and
for leave to appeal. 3 6 Subsequently, the appellate court permitted Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) to intervene. 7
State Farm petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for direct certification. 3 ' Following State Farm's petition, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (Liberty Mutual) successfully moved
before the court to intervene.3 9 The New Jersey Supreme Court
granted State Farm's petition for direct certification in November
1990.40 In an opinion by Justice Handler, the supreme court
held that the Reform Act did not absolutely preclude insurers
from earning a fair rate of return. 41 The court therefore held
that the Reform Act was not facially unconstitutional as either a
taking without just compensation or as a violation of due
process.4 2
PRIOR CASES

Historically, the standards applied to regulatory takings
including allegations of a contracts clause violation, and a claim that the Reform
Act was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. Id.; see infra notes 136-43 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's examination of these claims.
35 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 39-40, 590 A.2d at 195. The trial court determined
that the contract impairment and takings claims were related and that proof of a
takings violation was imperative to establishing the contract clause violation. Id. at
39, 590 A.2d at 195. The court declared that the statutory assessments were valid
as long as they did not attain confiscatory proportions, or violate due process. Id.
Although relief from the surtaxes was forbidden, the court found that the Reform
Act did not absolutely prohibit rate relief from the assessments. Id. In conclusion,
the court held that a hearing was mandated to ascertain whether State Farm could
secure an adequate rate of return via rate increase filings. Id.
36 Id. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195. The stay remained intact when the New Jersey
Supreme Court denied State Farm's application, filed the next day, to vacate the
stay. Id. The motion for leave to appeal was granted in July 1990. Id.
37 Id. Allstate was simultaneously pursuing a similar claim in the Chancery Division. Id. Originally, Allstate had commenced an action in federal court, which was
dismissed without prejudice on the grounds that the power to decide state tax matters resided in the state courts. See Jeffrey Kanige, If At First, N.J.L.J., July 19, 1990,
at 6.
38 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195.
39 Id. Liberty Mutual, like Allstate, had filed in federal court, only to have the
complaint dismissed without prejudice. Id.; see also Kanige, supra note 37 at 6.
40 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 40, 590 A.2d at 195.
41 Id. at 62-63, 590 A.2d at 207.
42 Id. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207.
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claims have varied, depending on the precise nature of the industry subject to governmental control.4 3 In Munn v. Illinois,44 the
Court explored the constitutional propriety of an Illinois statute
which set maximum prices for grain storage. 45 The owner of a
grain storage and weighing facility challenged the law as an un43 Id. at 47, 590 A.2d at 199. Takings jurisprudence originally developed in the
land use arena. See, e.g., First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 306-7 (1987) (takings which deny property owner all use of land, though temporary, require just compensation); Penn Central v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 109,
138 (1978) (historical landmark designation restricting exercise of property rights
did not constitute a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) (statute
taking private property to benefit private parties upheld due to overriding public
benefit); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926) (local
zoning ordinance upheld despite diminution in certain property values); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922) (statute proscribing certain
mining operations, thereby destroying property rights without compensation,
struck down as beyond the scope of the state's police power); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (municipal ordinance limiting land use upheld); see
also Sandra L. Vieser, Note, Monetary Compensationfor Temporary Regulatory Taking is

Requiredfor the Period Duringwhich the Regulation is Effective, 18

SETON HALL LAW REV.

1041 (1988) (tracing the evolution of the standards applied to regulatory takings of
real property);John H. Klock & Peter H. Cook, The Condemning of America: Regulatory
"Takings" and the Purchase By the United States of America's Wetlands, 18 SETON HALL
LAw REV. 330, 331 (1988) (analyzing regulatory takings claims with regard to privately owned wetlands).
The supreme court developed and refined takings standards in a line of cases
examining the constitutional implications of public utility rate regulation. State
Farm, 124 N.J. at 47, 590 A.2d at 199. See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488
U.S. 299, 301 (1989) (state regulatory scheme for electrical generating facilities did
not constitute a taking); In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 771-72
(1968) (although regulation of natural gas did not explicitly set forth conditions
mandating relief, the Commission's guarantees for special relief were sufficient to
pass constitutional muster); FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603
(1944) (natural gas rates constitutional if return on investment is comparable to the
return received by similar businesses).
The Supreme Court further distilled these criteria in a series of challenges to
rent-control ordinances and established a polestar for analyzing subsequent takings
claims. State Farm, 124 N.J. at 47, 590 A.2d at 199; see also, Pennel v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 4 (1988) (city rent control ordinance designed to prevent unreasonable rent increases is valid exercise of police powers); Helmsley v. Borough of
Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 226, 394 A.2d 65, 78 (1978) (effective administrative relief
mechanism is constitutionally mandated where a regulatory scheme will have a predictable and extensive confiscatory impact) appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 978 (1979);
Hutton Park Gardens v. Town Council, 68 N.J. 543, 574 350 A.2d 1,17 (1975)
(apartment owners are entitled to fair rate of return, though no precise rate relief
mechanism is required).
44 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
45 Id. at 123. Generally, the statute governed the licensing of operators of grain
storage and weighing facilities. Id. at 116. Munn & Scott had operated a grain handling and storage business for nearly ten years prior to enactment of the statute. Id.
at 118. Munn & Scott violated the act by failing to take out a license allowing them
to conduct business as public warehousemen. Id. Additionally, Munn & Scott
charged rates for storage and handling in excess of the statutory limit. Id.
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constitutional regulation of private property, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process.4 6
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Waite noted that industries "affected with a public interest" have traditionally been
subject to regulation for the public good. 47 After protracted
analysis of the grain business, the Court identified it as an industry clearly affected with a public interest 48 and concluded that the
governmental prerogative to regulate grain storage was firmly
entrenched in the common law.4 9
The power to regulate, the Court observed, included im46 Id. at 123. Munn & Scott also contended that the statute violated the Commerce Clause. Id. The Court dismissed this claim, noting that interstate commerce
was not involved and therefore the regulation was solely a state concern that did
not encroach Congress' exclusive domain to regulate interstate commerce. Id. at
135.
47 Id. at 126. Chief Justice Waite began by observing that all statutes are accorded a presumption of validity, and should not be declared invalid unless clearly
repugnant to the Constitution. Id. at 123. The Chief Justice further proclaimed
that in passing on close questions of statutory constitutionality, courts must defer
to the legislature's expressed intent. Id.
Chief Justice Waite next traced the common law history of state regulatory
practices. Id. 124-25. At common law, many occupations were deemed to be invested with a public interest and thus subject to government regulation, including
innkeepers, wharfingers, bakers, millers, common carriers, hackmen, ferry operators and chimney sweeps. Id. at 125.
The Chief Justice also remarked that this concept pre-dated the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Delving into common law annals, Chief Justice
Waite cited a then two-hundred year old authority, Lord ChiefJustice Hale, who in
his treatise De Portibus Maris, 1 Harg. Law Tracts, 78, declared that when private
property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to bejuris privati only"; Id. at
125-126. The Court concluded that when used in ways that affect the community at
large, property becomes cloaked with a public interest and thus subject to government regulation. Id. at 126. The holder of the property, by devoting his property to
a public use, implicitly agrees to regulation for the common good. Id.
The Court professed that this concept was embodied in the epigram "sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas" which dictated that each individual must use his or her
property in a manner that will not injure others. Id. at 124-25. The expression's
reasoning is circuitous and has been characterized as "[u]tterly useless as a legal
maxim." JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 923 (1981) (quoting
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951)). Dukeminier & Krier illustrate this criticism by posing a hypothetical in which one landowner's property use is restricted
because of potential impairment to a neighbor's land. Id. Thus, the jurisprudence
in this area has been a constant struggle to properly balance these competing interests. Id.
48 Id. at 131-32; see also supra note 47 for an explanation of this standard.
49 Id. at 133. Because this type of regulation was typically viewed as falling
within the sovereign power, the Court determined that the concept of regulation
for the public welfare had been embraced by and incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 125. The Court held that Fourteenth
Amendment due process did not create new or unprecedented constraints on state
regulation, but rather embodied this common law understanding. Id.
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plicit authority to set prices, tempered by the common law restraint that the prices not be unreasonable. 50 In upholding the
Illinois regulatory scheme, the Court concluded that reasonable
regulation of property affected with a public interest was constitutional and did not violate Fourteenth Amendment due process
guarantees. 5 '
The Supreme Court delineated the modern standards for
substantive due process analysis of state law in the landmark case
Nebbia v. New York. 5 2 In Nebbia, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New York law designed to safeguard the public
availability of wholesome milk by fixing minimum sale prices for
the commodity.5"
In an opinion by Justice Roberts, the Court provided the
benchmark for assessing future due process challenges and held
that due process only demanded that laws be rationally related to
the legislative objective and not be capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable.5 4 The Court found that New York's price fixing scheme
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable,5 5 and concluded that the
plan was rationally related to the goal of protecting the public
availability of potable milk.5 6 Accordingly, the Court upheld the
50 Id. at 134. Munn & Scott argued that the determination of a reasonable return should be made by the courts, not the legislature. Id. at 133. The court rejected this contention and observed that traditionally, matters affecting the public
interest were left to the legislature. Id. at 133-34. Failing to specify what a reasonable return means, Chief Justice Waite observed that such regulations could be
changed on even a legislative whim provided that legislation did not exceed the
boundaries of constitutional limitations. Id. at 134.
51 Id. at 134-35.
52 291 U.S. 502 (1934); see also supra note 2 for a survey of due process analysis
prior to Nebbia.
53 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 515. In response to a mounting crisis in the milk industry,
the New York Legislature promulgated Chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933. Id. Section 302 of this Act established a Milk Control Board. Id. at 519 n.2. Subsequent
sections empowered the board to take measures to guarantee the supply of unadulterated milk to the public, and to protect the milk industry from destructive competitive forces. Id. The express authority to establish minimum and maximum
prices for milk was delegated in § 312(b). Id. at 520 n.2. Justice Roberts noted that
this legislation was the product of extensive research into the nature and magnitude of the problem. Id. at 516.
54 Id. at 525. The Court also noted that each regulation must be assessed in
light of the relevant circumstances and that a valid regulation in one industry may
be invalid when applied to a different industry or under different circumstances. Id.
55 Id. at 530.
56 Id. Citing Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876),Justice Roberts observed that
a state may legitimately regulate the price charged for goods or services affected
with a public interest. Id. at 532-33; see also supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text
for analysis of Munn.
Justice Roberts added that fixing minimum prices in furtherance of the public
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New York law, concomitantly revising the contours of substantive
due process analysis.5 7
One decade later, the Court defined the parameters of the
takings clause in the realm of public utility rate and price control
in Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co. 58 Hope Natural
Gas challenged the validity of a rate order issued by the Federal
Power Commission (FPC) fixing natural gas rates.5 9
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas explained that the
rate making formula at issue balanced competing interests to arrive at rates deemed just and reasonable.60 Examining the elements of this balancing test, Justice Douglas delineated several
investor and company interests and noted their significance in
the rate setting process. 6 ' Justice Douglas declared that under
this type of regulatory scheme, the return on investment should
be comparable to the return received by other businesses facing
similar risks and should sustain confidence in the economic stainterest was not unprecedented and that such regulation would not be invalidated
unless it was "arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant" to the legislative objective. Id. at 538-39. The Court found that the law in question sought to
regulate prices in an industry with a long history of regulation for the public welfare. Id.
57 Id. at 539. Justice Roberts opined that courts should not question economic
policies adopted by legislatures but should defer to legislative prerogatives and
presume the validity of these enactments. Id. at 537-38. Justice Roberts further
declared that "[t]hough the court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not be annulled unless palpably in excess of legislative power." Id. at
538.
58 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
59 Id. at 593. The rate order was issued pursuant to § 4(a) and § 5(a) of the
Natural Gas Act, which empowered the FPC to determine just and reasonable rates.
Id. at 600. The primary purpose of the Act was to protect consumers from exploitation by the natural gas companies. Id. at 611. Hope was displeased with a reduction
in the rates it was allowed to charge customers. Id. at 599. Specifically, Hope challenged the method by which the FPC determined depreciation and property values
as part of the rate setting calculus. Id. at 597-98.
60 Id. at 603. In determining just and reasonable rates, the Court held that the
outcome, and not the method used to reach it, was the controlling element. Id. at
602. Justice Douglas noted that in setting rates, the FPC was not obligated to use
any particular formula because Congress failed to provide a specific calculus for
arriving at just and reasonable rates. Id. at 600. Moreover, the Court asserted that
even infirmities in the method utilized would not render a rate order invalid. Id. at
602. Finally,Justice Douglas declared that because rate orders were the product of
expert judgment, they were endowed with a heavy presumption of validity unless
the party challenging the rates convincingly demonstrated unjust and unreasonable
consequences. Id.
61 Id. at 603. Justice Douglas observed that investor and company interests demand revenue adequate to cover operating expenses, as well as the venture's capital costs, including stock dividends and debt service. Id.
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bility of the venture. 62 TeCu
The Court upheld the rate fixing
scheme
63
because the rate order at issue satisfied these criteria.
In Permian Basin Area Rate Cases6' natural gas producers challenged a rate structure that proscribed maximum rates for geographical areas, rather than setting rates based on a producer's
individual situation.65 The gas producers criticized the scheme
for failing to provide adequate relief to individual producers who
had been denied a reasonable return.66
In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court acknowledged
that, traditionally, government agencies had been granted substantial latitude in setting rates for regulated classes.6 7 Profits of
62 Id. More specifically, the Court declared that the return should be sufficient
to promote investor confidence in the endeavor in order to attract capital and maintain credit. Id. Justice Douglas asserted that even rates producing only minimal
returns would be valid if they allowed the enterprise to operate successfully and to
recompense investors for risks undertaken. Id. at 605.
63 Id. at 607. In analyzing whether the rate order would allow Hope to meet
these criteria, the Court provided a lengthy analysis of Hope's recent financial history. Id. at 603-04. The Court stated that in setting Hope's return, the FPC had
emphasized the significance of safeguarding the financial stability of the business.
Id. at 604. Justice Douglas added that, based on an analysis of numerous fiscal
criteria, the FPC had concluded that the new rates would not deter the operation
from attracting capital on favorable terms. Id. at 605.
64 390 U.S. 747 (1968).
65 Id. at 754. The Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1898), empowered the FPC
to regulate natural gas sold interstate. Permian, 390 U.S. at 754. Originally, the FPC
set rates based on each producer's operating costs. Id. at 756. This method ultimately proved unsuitable for independent producers, due to the erratic and unpredictable nature of their investments. Id. at 756-57. Additionally, the onerous
administrative burden of determining individual rates of return induced the Commission to revise its approach. Id. at 757-58. In 1960, the Commission promulgated that individual cost of service determinations would no longer be employed,
and that maximum rates would be established for each primary production area. Id.
at 758. Pursuant to § 5(a) of the Natural Gas Act, a series of hearings was held to
determine these rates. Permian, 390 U.S. at 758.
Between October 11, 1961 and September 10, 1963, the Commission conducted hearings, featuring 336 gas producers among the 384 total parties, which
generated over 30,000 pages of transcripts. Id. at 755 n.4. The examiner issued a
decision in September 1964, establishing rates and additional guidelines. Id.Applications for rehearing were denied in a supplementary opinion issued October 4,
1965. Id.
66 Id. at 770. The gas producers averred that as members of a class subject to
rate regulation, they must be permitted to either retire from the subject activity or
pursue special relief from regulations. Id. Under this scheme, the Commission permitted relief upon demonstration that a producer's "our-of-pocket expenses" exceeded revenues on a particular well. Id. at 770-71. The Commission further
proclaimed that relief would be granted under certain conditions, but did not delineate those conditions. Id.at 771. The Commission placed the burden ofjustifying
relief on a producer and stated that enforcement of the area rates would not be
stayed pending resolution of individual claims. Id.
67 Id. at 769 (citations omitted). The Court noted that administrative agencies
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gas producers could be radically curtailed, Justice Harlan
averred, because the just and reasonable standard in the Natural
Gas Act created a broad zone of reasonableness, with most rates
enjoying a presumption of validity.6" Evaluating the adequacy of
rate relief provisions for individual class members denied a fair
return, Justice Harlan acknowledged that the regulations did not
explicitly set forth the conditions mandating relief.6 9 The Court
held, however, that the Commission's expansive guarantees of
special relief were not unconstitutional.70
Several years later, in FPC v. Texaco Inc.,71 the Court examined the validity of a natural gas price fixing regime which
placed strict limits on the costs that large natural gas producers
could pass through to customers.7 2 Texaco, a large natural gas
producer, challenged a Federal Power Commission rate order
and legislatures had long been permitted to set rates for regulated classes without
first examining the impact on each individual class member, provided there was
"representative evidence" to support the regulation. Id.
68 Id. at 770-71. The Court declared that investors' interests were but one facet
of constitutional reasonableness and cautioned that the "power to regulate is not a
power to destroy." Id. (quoting Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307,
331 (1886)). The Court concluded that the rates must be relevant to an appropriate legislative objective and must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. Id. at 769-70
(quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934)).
69 Id. at 770-71.
70 Id. at 772. The Court reversed a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals, which had found these provisions deficient due to vagueness. Id. at 771. The
regulations permitted rate relief only in narrowly prescribed circumstances, with
the burden of establishing the necessity of relief falling heavily on the producer. Id.
at 771; see also supra note 66.
71 417 U.S. 380 (1974).
72 Id. at 387. Federal Power Commission Order No. 428 (45 F.P.C. 454 (1971))
provided that sales by small producers were to be exempted from the direct rate
regulation imposed on large producers and pipeline operators. FPC v. Texaco, 417
U.S. at 382. Small producers were identified as independent producers whose sales
"did not exceed 10,000,000 Mcf at 14.65 psia during any calendar year." Id. at 383
n.l.
Pipelines and large producers were allowed to recover, through their rates, any
reasonable expenses incurred in purchasing gas from small producers. Id. at 387.
Large producers and pipeline operators were permitted to charge only just and
reasonable prices, however, and were required to refund customer payments based
on excessive purchased gas costs. Id. at 391.
Conversely, small producers were free to sell their gas at the best obtainable
price and, theoretically, could contract with large producers at a price higher than
the large producers could legally charge customers, without being required to refund the surplus. Id.
The Court noted that the risk of striking a bad deal and the burden ofjustifying costs rested on the large producers. Id. Effectively, large producers and pipeline operators were assigned the risk of making certain they struck a good bargain
with small producers; if they did not, they could not pass through to customers the
excessive cost of purchased gas. Id.
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that permitted large producers to pass through only the reasonable costs of purchased gas.7 3
Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, upheld the
passthrough prohibitions on the large producers7 4 but struck
down the rate order as unduly vague. 75 Addressing the pass
through limitations, the Court emphasized that the Commission
should have the discretionary power to burden the large producers with the risks attendant to bargaining with small producers
for reasonable prices.7 6 Justice White discounted allegations that
this scheme would have a confiscatory effect as premature because the full impact of the regulation could not be determined
without examining future applications as well. 7 7 Accordingly, the
Court upheld the Act's prohibition on cost passthroughs subject
to judicial review of specific orders based on the indirect
73 Id. at 387. The Court emphasized that all regulated rates are governed by the
just-and-reasonable standard, set forth in §§ 4 and 5 of the Natural Gas Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 717c and 717d (1988). FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. at 386. Failing to delineate the method for determining just and reasonable rates, the Act permitted rate
determinations via several methods, including the comparison of cost considerations of individual companies or the composite costs of area companies. Id. at 387.
Justice White observed that the means used to ascertain precisely what those rates
are was a matter properly left to the discretion of the Commission. Id. at 387-88
(quoting Wisconsin v. FPC, 373 U.S. 294, 309 (1963)). Finally, the Court reaffirmed the principle set forth in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591 (1944),
requiring that just and reasonable rate determinations be based on results, not the
method employed. FPC v. Texaco, 417 U.S. at 388.
74 Id. at 392.
75 Id. at 395-96. The Justice held that the rate order was imperfect because it
failed to ensure, as required by the Act, that all natural gas rates be just and reasonable. Id. at 396. Justice White averred that the rate order lacked the clarity required
of an administrative order. Id. at 395-396. The Court declared that the ambiguous
reliance on market prices was not sufficient to ensure that small producer rates met
the just and reasonable statutory requirement. Id. at 396-97. Deferring to the legislative intent behind the Natural Gas Act, the Court invalidated the Commission's
rate order. Id. at 400.
76 Id. at 392. Justice White explored the implications of the Act's failure to impose a requirement that small producers refund excess profits on gas sold at rates
subsequently deemed to have been unjust and unreasonable. Id. Justice White declared that the Commission did not abuse its discretionary power by exempting
small producers from refund obligations because the small producers were engaged in an important exploratory enterprise and consumers were protected from
excessive rates. In support of this reasoning, the Court noted that this decision
involved a balancing of competing interests. Id.
The Court highlighted the considerable public interest in protecting the small
producers to facilitate their exploration for new gas sources which could result in
greater gas production and assure continued just and reasonable rates. Id.
77 Id. at 392. The Justice added that although the regulatory scheme was admittedly experimental, the Commission had pledged to closely monitor the effects of
the scheme. Id. at 392-93.
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78

regulation.
In Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 79 the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed a regulatory taking claim in the context of municipal rent control.8 0 The owners of several multiple-family
dwellings in Fort Lee challenged the general application of a municipal rent control ordinance that limited annual rent increases." 1 The ordinance restricted rate relief, by permitting
landlords to pass through the increased cost of real estate taxes
directly to tenants.8 2
Writing for the unanimous court, Justice Mountain determined that the ordinance would steadily decrease profits for a
78 Id. at 393. In determining whether current regulations have a confiscatory
effect, Justice White averred that courts must ascertain whether the regulations will
allow the business to-maintain its economic stability, "attract necessary capital, and
fairly compensate investors for the risk they have assumed, and yet provide appropriate protection to the relevant pubic interests both existing and foreseeable." Id.
at 393 (quoting Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968)).
Justice White also recognized the potential for the enhanced risk to large producers of incurring unrecoverable expenses if the Commission failed to provide
adequate guidelines as to what rates would be deemed excessive. Id. This problem,
Justice White declared, should be addressed on remand. Id.
79 78 N.J. 200, 394 A.2d 65 (1978), appeal dismissed 440 U.S. 978 (1979).
80 Id. at 204, 394 A.2d at 67. Ord. No. 74-32, enacted by Fort Lee on November
6, 1974, limited rent increases to corresponding Consumer Price Index percentage
increases. Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 204, 394 A.2d at 67. This general rule, however, was
subject to a significant condition, whereby no rent increase could exceed 2.5% of
the prior year's rent. Id. at 204-05, 394 A.2d at 67.
81 Id. at 205, 394 A.2d at 67. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance was not
justifiable as an emergency response to a housing shortage and that it denied them
a constitutionally adequate rate of return. Id. Two weeks after the ordinance was
enacted, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order suspending the enforcement of the 2.5% increase limitation. Id. In July, 1975, the trial court upheld
the facial validity of the limitation but left the restraining order in effect, and placed
rent increases exceeding 2.5% in escrow. Id. at 205-06, 394 A.2d at 67. The New
Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed the judgment of the trial court
in March 1977. Id. at 206, 394 A.2d at 67. The NewJersey Supreme Court granted
certification and consolidated the principle case with two other cases then pending
in the Appellate Division. Id. at 206-07, 394 A.2d at 68. These three cases were
remanded for a plenary hearing to determine what constituted a just and reasonable return. Id. at 207, 394 A.2d at 68. On March 1, 1978, the trial court declared
the rent control scheme confiscatory and invalid. Id. at 208, 394 A.2d at 68.
After detailing this elaborate procedural history, the court pointed to the
unique character of this challenge which involved the legislation's impact on an
entire municipality, rather than simply a particular building or landlord. Id. at 208,
394 A.2d at 68-69. This posture eliminated the generally required and often cumbersome administrative relief process because Fort Lee's administrative agency did
not possess the authority to review the general impact of the ordinance challenged.
Id. at 208, 394 A.2d 69.
82 Id. at 205, 394 A.2d at 67. Additionally, Ord. No. 75-45 set forth guidelines
governing hardship relief available to landlords to augment the automatic increases
provided by Ord. No. 74-32. Helmsley, 78 N.J. at 205, 394 A.2d at 67.
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significant segment of landlords in Fort Lee, eventually attaining
confiscatory proportions.8a According to the justice, the constitution required that an effective administrative relief mechanism
must accompany a regulatory scheme if the scheme would have a
predictable and extensive confiscatory impact.84 After careful
analysis, Justice Mountain held that the Fort Lee ordinance failed
to provide an adequate conduit for swift and effective relief.85
Noting the foreseeable confiscatory impact and ineffective administrative relief provisions, Justice Mountain concluded that
the ordinance, as applied, violated the Constitution.86
The constitutional challenge in Calfarm Insurance Company v.
83 Id. at 222-23, 394 A.2d at 75-76. Justice Mountain began his analysis by considering the various methods for calculating a landlord's fair rate of return. Id. at
210, 394 A.2d at 70. Justice Mountain identified three approaches that had been
employed in formulating a landlord's proper rate of return: return on market
value, return on investment, and the fraction of gross income comprised by operating profits. Id. at 210-211, 394 A.2d at 70. Justice Mountain declared that the valuation method presented " 'difficult problems of proof' " Id. at 213, 394 A.2d at 71.
(quoting Troy Hills Village v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Tp. Council, 68 N.J. 604, 624
(1975)), and that "a value-based criterion for confiscation under rent control is
practically unworkable." Id. at 215, 394 A.2d 72. The court noted that the plaintiffs
presented no evidence regarding their level of investment. Id. at 216, 394 A.2d at
72. The third method, adopted by this court, involved an analysis of the percentage of income allocated to operating expenses. Id. at 211, 394 A.2d at 70.
Justice Mountain declared that the plaintiffs had the burden of proving the
ordinance would produce a sweeping confiscatory effect on efficient operations, not
merely an adverse impact on select properties. Id. at 218, 394 A.2d at 73. Although
the plaintiffs failed to prove a confiscatory effect before 1976, the court concluded
that the financial data the plaintiffs had submitted demonstrated a foreseeable confiscatory effect after 1976. Id. at 220, 394 A.2d at 74-75. Justice Mountain based
this conclusion on an inequality between operating expenses and rent increases. Id.
at 222-23, 394 A.2d at 76. This disparity would engender a "steady erosion" of net
operating income eventually attaining confiscatory proportions. Id.
84 Id. at 226, 394 A.2d at 78. Justice Mountain professed that even exacting rent
control ordinances would be permissible, as long as they included provisions for
swift and equitable administrative relief. Id. at 242, 394 A.2d at 85. Justice Mountain also noted that if a municipality failed to provide an adequate administrative
relief mechanism, the municipality must employ a regulatory scheme that was less
apt to result in confiscatory rates. Id. at 242, 394 A.2d at 86.
85 Id. at 228, 394 A.2d at 79. The court considered five factors in determining
the effectiveness of the administrative relief available under this ordinance: the
timeliness of relief, the inadequacy of relief attributable to "regulatory lag," the
scheme's increased reliance on the "hardship mechanism," the vague hardship relief criteria, and the prescribed method of calculating a just and reasonable return.
Id. at 228-31, 394 A.2d at 79-80.
86 Id. at 233, 394 A.2d at 81. Although the 2.5% limitation was found unconstitutional, the court declared that the limitation was severable. Id. The Court therefore upheld the statutory prohibition against rent increases that exceeded the
percentage growth of the Consumer Price Index. Id.
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Deukmejian8 7 focused on rate relief limitations in an automobile
insurance regulation scheme.8 8 Seven insurers and the Association of California Insurance Companies challenged the facial validity of Proposition 103, which required an immediate rate
reduction by at least twenty percent and limited the availability of
rate relief to only insurers substantially threatened with
insolvency.8 9
Writing for a unanimous California Supreme Court, Justice
Broussard asserted that in determining whether a particular statute was confiscatory, a court must focus on the effect of the regulation, rather than the method of fixing rates.9" The justice
remarked that because price fixing statutes often appeared
facially valid, yet proved confiscatory when applied, courts have
scrutinized these statutes to ensure the possibility of timely and
effective relief.9 '
Applying this analysis to Proposition 103, Justice Broussard
proclaimed that requiring insolvency before granting rate relief
violated due process. 9 2 The court reasoned that an insurer with
771 P.2d 1247 (Cal. 1989).
Id. at 1249-50. In November 1988, responding to rapidly escalating insurance rates, California enacted Proposition 103, a program designed to fundamentally alter the state's insurance industry. Id. at 1249. Beginning with a statement of
findings and purpose, Proposition 103 declared that " '[einormous increases in the
cost of insurance have made it both unaffordable and unavailable to millions of
Californians' and noted that 'existing laws inadequately protected consumers and
allow[ed] insurance companies to charge excessive, unjustified and arbitrary
rates.' " Id. at 1249-50 (quoting CAL. INSURANCE CODE § 1861.01 historical n.
supp. 1992)).
The Supreme Court of California assumed original jurisdiction over the dispute, citing on the gravity of the matter and the need for a timely resolution. Id. at
1249. Some provisions of the act were applicable only in the first year. Id. Thus,
the court decided to hear the case before that period expired. Id.
89 Id. at 1250 (citing CAL. INSURANCE CODE § 1861.01 (a), (b)). Section (a) required immediate reduction of insurance rates to a level at least twenty percent
below the contemporary rates. Id. Section (b) dictated that rate relief would not be
granted prior to November 8, 1990, unless an insurer was substantially threatened
with insolvency. Id. Additionally, § 1861.04 -.10 set forth the procedures for rate
increase applications. Calfarm Insurance Company, 771 P.2d at 1250.
90 Id. at 1252. Justice Broussard began by indicating that all statutes must be
presumed valid unless undeniably unconstitutional. Id. at 1251. (citations omitted).
The justice next declared that the court would find a statute facially invalid only if it
"preclud[ed] avoidance of confiscatory results.' " Id. at 1252 (citation omitted).
91 Id. at 1252-53 (citing Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (1.976)); see
supra note 85 discussing factors relevant to the effectiveness of rate relief
provisions.
92 Id. at 1255-56. The supreme court explained that insolvency may be ascribed
numerous meanings. Id. at 1253. Justice Broussard stated that a business may be
insolvent if liabilities exceed assets or if it is incapable of paying obligations as they
arise. Id; see also U.C.C. § 1-201 (23) (1991) ("[a] person is 'insolvent' who either
87
88
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significant assets could endure confiscatory rates on insurance
lines without becoming insolvent.9 3 Accordingly, the court held
that the absence of adequate relief for insurers faced with confiscatory rates rendered the provision invalid.94
One year later, insurers questioned the constitutionality of a
relief mechanism in a similar statutory plan in Guaranty National
Insurance Co. v. Gates.95 Eight insurance companies challenged a
has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot pay his
debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning of the federal bankruptcy law"); BL.cK's LAw DICTIONARY 797 (6th ed. 1990) (setting forth similar
definitions, as well as defining 'technical' insolvency as a "situation in which a firm
is unable to meet its current obligations as they come due, even though the value of
its assets may exceed it liabilities").
Despite the variety of definitions for insolvency, the court declared that no interpretation of insolvency would permit the court to find subdivision (b) in conformity with the fair and reasonable return mandated by the Constitution. Calfarm,
771 P.2d at 1253.
In its discussion of the Calfarm decision, the State Farm court noted that
although the Calfarm holding was based on a due process violation, the analysis
used by that court was essentially a takings analysis. State Farm, 124 N.J. 32, 50, 590
A.2d 191, 200 (1991). These analyses often produce congruous results. See supra
note 3 and for discussion of the correlation between takings and due process
analysis.
93 Id. at 1254. Insurers with substantial external sources of income, or considerable capital resources, could sustain tremendous losses without risk of insolvency.
Id. The court noted that although the provision vested the commissioner with
some discretion to determine whether an insurer was "substantially threatened with
insolvency," this discretion was clearly limited, and would not safeguard constitutionally adequate relief for all insurers. Id. at 1254 n. 1.
94 Id. at 1255-56. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Broussard dismissed the
assertion that a relief mechanism was not required because subdivision (b) was justified as a temporary emergency measure. Id. at 1255. Although some caselaw supported an absolute price freeze without furnishing a method to obtain relief, the
justice distinguished those cases due to the twenty percent rate reduction mandated in the case at bar. Id. at 1254-55; see also Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.
2d 1001 (1976) (rent control law struck down where procedures for securing relief
from confiscatory rates were overly cumbersome).
The court acknowledged that "emergency situations may require emergency
measures." Calfarm, 771 P.2d at 1255. Nonetheless, the court observed that " 'an
emergency situation would have to be a temporary situation of such enormity that
all individuals might reasonably be required to make sacrifices for the common
weal.'" Id. (quoting Hutton Park Gardens v. West Orange Town Council, 68 N.J.
543, 567, 350 A.2d 1, 14 (1975)). Declaring the auto insurance quagmire a chronic
situation requiring more than a quick-fix, the court held that subdivision (b) was
not justified as an emergency measure. Id.
Justice Broussard therefore severed the unconstitutional provision from the
corpus of the statute and upheld the initiative, based on other constitutional relief
provisions that were originally intended to govern future years. Id. at 1259. These
procedures for rate relief included "application to the commissioner, the opportunity to seek interim relief, a. hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and judicial review." Id.
95 916 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1990). The insurers asserted that the statutory plan
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state law mandating a fifteen percent rate roll back on auto insurance premiums, with a one year moratorium on rate increases. 9 6
The scheme allowed rate relief only for insurers substantially
threatened with insolvency. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
found the statute unconstitutional.9 8 Writing for the panel, and
referencing the analysis set forth in Calfarm, Judge Leavy distinguished the Nevada law from the California provision. 99 The
permitted Nevada to impose confiscatory rates, denied insurers a fair rate of return,
and violated due process by failing to provide a relief mechanism to avoid confiscatory results. Id. at 509. The insurers also asserted that the plan was invalid as a
temporary emergency measure. Id. at 512. The appellate court perfunctorily dismissed this claim despite the fact that it was the apparent basis for the district
court's decision. Id. at 511, 516.
96 Id. at 509. Subsection 1 of the statute provided, in pertinent part, that "every
insurer shall reduce its charges for motor vehicle liability insurance to levels which
are at least 15% less than the charges for the same coverage which were in effect on
July 1, 1988." Id. at 509-10 (quoting NEv. REV. STAT., Chapter 784, § (1) (1989)).
97 Id. at 510. Subsection 2 stated that:
Between October 1, 1989, and October 1, 1990, rates and premiums
reduced pursuant to this subsection may only be increased if the commissioner of insurance finds, after a hearing, that an insurer is substantially threatened with insolvency. The commissioner of insurance
shall consider the profitability of all lines of insurance transacted by
an insurer licensed to do business in this state in determining whether
the insurer is substantially threatened with insolvency. For purposes
of this subsection, "insolvency" means the financial condition wherein
the sum of the insurer's debts is greater than all of the insurer's property, at fair valuation.
Id. at 510 (quoting NEv. REV. STAT., Chapter 784, § 1 (2) (1989); see also supra note
92 for a general discussion of the various definitions of insolvency.
98 Id. at 512. In earlier proceedings, the United States District Court for the
District of Nevada had granted the Insurance Commissioner's motion for summary
judgment, and found the regulatory plan justified as a temporary emergency moratorium. Id. at 510-11. The insurance companies appealed, and the appellate court
delayed the statute's application awaiting resolution of the appeal. Id. at 511. On
appeal, the appellate court first examined the issues of subject matter jurisdiction
and held that federal jurisdiction was appropriate because the constitutional right
to due process was at stake. Id. at 512.
99 Id. at 514-15. Judge Leavy observed that both the Calfarm plan and the Nevada statute required a rate reduction and a one year rate freeze. Id. at 513. In
Calfarm, the statute limited relief during the first year of the plan to insurers
threatened with insolvency but permitted relief for inadequate rates in future years.
Id. at 514. The California Supreme Court severed the insolvency provision and
determined that when the insolvency provision was stricken, the regulation as to
future years would apply to the first year, guaranteeing the insurers a constitutionally fair rate of return. Id. at 514 (citing Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d
1249, 1257-59 (Cal. 1989)).
Judge Leavy stated that although both plans proscribed "inadequate" rates,
the California plan did not include a definition of this term. Id. at 515. The Nevada
Insurance Code did, however, define the term, providing that "[r]ates are inadequate if they are clearly insufficient, together with the income attributable to them,
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judge determined that the statutory scheme's legislative context
and extant provisions precluded severance of the unconstitutional insolvency requirement.' l ° Accordingly, the appellate
court invalidated the scheme as unconstitutional.' 0 '
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENT

Utilizing the principles gleaned from the various takings
cases and applying the Nebbia due process standard, the New
Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the surtaxes and assessments imposed by the Reform Act would necessarily produce
confiscatory results.'0 ° The court determined that the Reform
Act neither precluded insurers from receiving a fair rate of return
nor violated due process. 0 3 Accordingly, the court deemed the
Act facially constitutional.'0 4
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Handler examined
the legislative history, statutory language, and administrative interpretation of sections 75, 78 and 2g of the Reform Act.'0 5 Considering both the insurers' and the state's interpretations of the
section 78 passthrough restrictions,'0 6 the justice concluded that
to sustain projected losses and expenses in the class of business of which they apply." Id. (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 686B.050(3) (1989)). This definition, Judge
Leavy reasoned, fell short of the constitutional mandate of a fair and reasonable
return because it merely assured that insurers would break even. Id. Consequently,
Judge Leavy concluded that severing the invalid insolvency provision would not
save the statue because the rates generally required by Nevada law would nonetheless result in a facially confiscatory scheme. Id.
100 Id. at 516.
101 Id. Judge Leavy also disposed of an ancillary issue, declaring that the Insur-

ance Commissioner's power to grant discretionary relief regarding rates voluntarily
set at "unreasonably low" levels could not be applied with respect to statutorily set
rates. Id. at 575.
102 State Farm, 124 N.J. 32, 63, 590 A.2d 191, 207 (1991). The court pronounced
that resolution of the primary issue depended on adjudication of two ancillary issues: first, whether the cost pass through prohibitions in §§ 75 and 78 were absolute, and second, whether the Insurance Commissioner had been granted
overriding authority to establish rates providing a reasonable rate of return. Id. at
51, 590 A.2d at 201.
103 Id. at 62-63, 590 A.2d at 206-207.
104 Id. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207.
105 Id. at 51-52, 590 A.2d at 201; see also supra notes 27, 28 and 31, and accompanying text for a discussion of these provisions.
106 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 52, 590 A.2d at 201. The insurers insisted that the
prohibition in § 78 was absolute and required the insurance commissioner to ensure that policyholders did not pay for the surtaxes. Id. The insurers added that
§ 75 absolutely precluded cost passthroughs for assessments by foreclosing the
only mechanism for transferring the burden of these assessments to policyholders.
Id. Conversely, the state maintained that while § 75 banned surcharges, it did not
preclude consideration of surtaxes and assessments in the ratemaking process. Id.
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the passthrough prohibition in section 78 was absolute.' 0 7 Furthermore, Justice Handler held that although the section 75 restrictions were not as broad as those in section 78, the provisions
indicated a legislative intent to prohibit shifting the surcharge
0 8
burden to consumers.1
Justice Handler next considered the legislative history, noting its value in divining legislative intent.'0 9 The justice focused
on several unsuccessfully proposed amendments to the questioned provisions, explaining that the reasons for the amendments' failure were relevant in discerning the intended effects of
the legislation." 0 Justice Handler explained that two sets of
amendments to the Reform Act had been proposed to bolster
passthrough prohibitions."' Noting the defeat of both sets of
The State asserted that §§ 75 and 78, tempered by § 2g's guarantee of a fair rate of
return, did not foreclose the possibility of relief through the ratemaking process. Id.
at 53, 590 A.2d at 202.
In addition to these contentions about the passthrough prohibitions, the parties also proffered disparate views as to the efficacy of other relief mechanisms incorporated into the Reform Act. Id. at 54, 590 A.2d at 202. The State noted that if
an insurer experienced an "unsound financial condition," the commissioner may
suspend the entity's obligation to pay the premium surtax and PLIGA assessments.
Id. at 54-55, 590 A.2d at 202-03. The State further claimed that numerous costsaving provisions in the legislation would augment the insurers' profitability by including ceilings on health care provider fees, personal injury award caps, storage
and towing charge limits and the establishment of a fraud deterrence program. Id.
at 55, 590 A.2d at 203. In rebuttal, the insurers protested that the savings "attribute[d] to the foregoing provisions [was] problematic and unrealistic." Id.
107 Id. at 53, 590 A.2d at 202.
108 Id. at 53, 590 A.2d at 202. The express language of § 75 prohibits only
surcharges on premiums in response to PLIGA assessments. Id. at 52, 590 A.2d at
201. Thus, the passthrough of these costs by other means, such as inclusion of the
assessments in the rate making process, could be interpreted as permissible; at that
time, however, surcharges were only prescribed method by which insurers could
recover the cost of PLIGA insolvency assessments. Id. at 53, 590 A.2d at 202. In
light of this, the Court determined that the Legislature, by barring recovery for the
JUA assessments through the only existing avenue, had intended to preclude recovery for these assessments altogether. Id. Interestingly, prior to a 1979 amendment,
PLIGA insolvency assessments were recouped through inclusion of the assessments
in the rate setting process. See NJ. STAT. ANN. 17:30A-16 historical n. (West 1988).
109 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 55-56, 590 A.2d at 203 (citing Lloyd v. Vermeulen, 22
N.J. 200, 125 A.2d 393 (1956)).
110 Id. at 56, 590 A.2d at 203. The court noted that newspaper reports and Assembly floor statements made up the bulk of the information submitted as legislative history. Id. Acknowledging the dubious value of the sources, the justice
explained that the records did offer valuable information regarding the fate of the
proposed amendments which contributed to an understanding of § § 75, 78 and 2g.
Id.
II Id. The first proposed amendments were introduced by Assemblyman Kamin
while the Assembly Appropriations Committee was reviewing the Reform Act. Id.
Kamin's proposed amendment to § 75 explicitly provided that "insurers could not
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amendments, the justice opined that the Assembly deemed the
proposed amendments redundant due to the absolute prohibitions already in place. 1 2 Supporting that conclusion, the court
cited a parallel interpretation of the passthrough prohibitions espoused in regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of
3
Insurance.'l

Continuing to analyze the legislative history, Justice Handler
addressed the addition of section 2g to the Reform Act."I4 The
justice observed that the legislature introduced this section contemporaneously with the proposed amendments to sections 75
and 78.' ' Section 2g, according to Justice Handler, recognized
and guaranteed the constitutional requirement that insurers be
allowed an adequate rate of return.' 6 Justice Handler opined
that the legislature's rejection of reinforcements on the passthrough prohibitions made clear that relief in the form of direct
passthrough of Reform Act charges had already been absolutely
prohibited.' '7 Nonetheless, the Commissioner of Insurance had
been granted implied authority by section 2g to guarantee insurers a fair rate of return."" Justice Handler noted that the Department of Insurance had reconciled these apparently conflicting
add a surcharge to premiums to compensate assessments paid into the fund [for the
PLIGA loans to the Auto Fund] or include any amount of the assessments ...as an
expense in any insurance rate filing." Id. (quoting Amendments proposed by Assemblyman Kamin to Assembly, No. 1, 204th Leg., 1st Sess. (1990) (Kamin Amendments), p. 11). Assemblyman Kamin's proposed amendment to § 78 provided:
"No insurer or rating organization shall include as an expense in any insurance rate
filing any amount paid for the surtax imposed pursuant to section 76." Id. [Kamin
Amendments, pp. 11-12.]
112 Id. at 57, 590 A.2d 204. The court also noted that although the prohibitions
in the proposed amendments were more specific than those ultimately adopted, the
provisions in the statute could nonetheless be absolute. Id. (citing Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 575, 583 A.2d 277, 289 (1990)).
113 Id. In a contemporary report, the commissioner made clear that the prohibitions contained in §§ 75 and 78 proscribe the inclusion of assessments and surtaxes
in "the expense base for determining rates." Id.
114 Id. Justice Handler noted that § 2g was not included in the Reform Act as
originally drafted but was proposed during the Assembly Appropriations Committee's consideration of the statute. Id.
115 Id. at 57-58, 590 A.2d at 204.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 58, 590 A.2d at 204.
118 Id. at 58, 590 A.2d 204. Justice Handler later voiced concern over whether
these regulations may only permit, but not require, the Commissioner to grant rate
relief. Id. at 62, 590 A.2d at 207. Nonetheless, the justice posited that "[i]t is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature conferred on the Commissioner of Insurance the necessary implied authority to satisfy the constitutional standard that it
expressly acknowledged in the statute." Id. at 58, 590 A.2d at 204. Justice Handler
stated that the court's "obligation to presume the constitutionality of legislation"
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provisions in regulations governing rate relief." 9 Justice Handler declared that this administrative interpretation of the Act,
guaranteeing an adequate rate of return, substantiated the inter120
pretation suggested by the antecedent legislative history.
The court acknowledged that although the regulations absolutely prohibited passthrough of surtaxes and assessments in conventional rate-making,' 2 1 the Insurance Department regulations
instituted a special rate-increase filing procedure for insurers alleging denial of a fair rate of return. 2 2 If an insurer demonstrated that it would be denied a constitutional rate of return,
Justice Handler explained the regulations empowered the Commissioner to grant rate relief.123 Furthermore, Justice Handler
declared that when rate relief was warranted, the Commissioner
could determine whether
such relief would be granted immedi12 4
ately or over time.
In conclusion, the court determined that the addition to the
Reform Act of section 2g evidenced the Legislature's recognition
required that the court assume that the commissioner would properly use this
power to protect insurers' rights. Id. at 62-63, 590 A.2d at 207.
''9 Id. at 58, 590 A.2d at 204.
120 Id. at 58, 590 A.2d at 204. The court explicated that an administrative interpretation is persuasive evidence in ascertaining legislative intent with regard to a
regulatory scheme. Id.
121 Id. at 59, A.2d at 205; N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.10 (b) (8) (1991).
122 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 61, 590 A.2d at 206; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:316.11 (1991) (establishing special filing requirements for insurers seeking to modify rates due to the surtaxes and assessments).
The regulations set forth, at great length and with specificity, the procedures
required for a special rate-increase filing. See id. (listing the requirements for a filing). The New Jersey Administrative Code required insurers seeking relief to submit a special rate filing, independent of any previously approved rate filing. N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.11 (a) (1991). The new filing must include all the information provided in ordinary rate filings (as set forth in N.J. ADMIN CODE § 11:3-16.6)
(1991), as well as a host of additional information. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.11
(b) (1991). Among the additional data required are: a schedule of operating premiums, operating expenses, and losses incurred for New Jersey lines of business; a
report on the insurer's internal accounting; and a description of the company's cost
allocation methodologies; and an explanation as to why the assessment should be
included in the ratemaking process. Id. The regulations also provide that the Commissioner may request any additional information deemed necessary in evaluating a
request for rate relief. Id.
123 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 60, 590 A.2d at 205-6. In rendering this determination,
the Commissioner must appraise an insurer's operational efficiency, the insurer's
allocation of expenses for New Jersey operations, the insurer's total experience on
all lines of business in New Jersey, and the synergistic effect of mandatory auto
insurance on other insurance lines written by the insurer. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE
§ 11:3-16, ll(d)(l)-(4) (1991).
124 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 60, 590 A.2d at 206 (quoting N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-

16.11 (0).
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and accommodation of the constitutional imperative that insurers
be allowed an adequate rate of return. 1 25 Justice Handler added
that courts favored such a construction when a contrary interpretation would render a statute unconstitutional. 1 26 The justice
stressed that the legislature had delegated to the Department of
Insurance the authority to determine what constituted a fair rate
of return and that the Commissioner had established an adequate
rate relief mechanism. 12 7 Justice Handler declared that section
2g prevented the Reform Act from unconstitutionally depriving
insurers of an adequate rate of return. 1 28 Accordingly, the court
held that the prohibitions in sections 75 and 78 did not work a
129
confiscatory taking and were facially constitutional.
Justice Handler summarily disposed of the auto insurers'
claim that the Reform Act, as applied in 1990, precluded those
insurers from earning an adequate rate of return. 130 The justice
averred that challenges based on the experience of particular insurers were more properly raised in the administrative ratemak31
ing process established by the Department of Insurance.'
Should this relief prove inadequate, Justice Handler
opined, in32
surers could pursue a remedy in the courts.
Turning to the insurers' due process claim, Justice Handler
held that because the Reform Act was not facially confiscatory, by
implication, it did not violate substantive due process. 133 The
Id. at 61, 590 A.2d at 206.
Id.
Id.; see also supra note 122 discussing the rate relief process established by N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.11.
128 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 61, 590 A.2d at 206. The court noted that the options
for relief available under the regulations had not yet been utilized. Id.
129 Id. at 62, 590 A.2d at 206.
130 Id. Justice Handler noted that the targeted profit of 3.5% of premiums was
subject to adjustment if constitutionally mandated and that a takings claim was not
established based merely on those income percentages presented. Id. at 62, 590
A.2d at 206-07.
131 Id. at 62, 590 A.2d at 207; see also supra note 122 for an overview of the
ratemaking process set forth in N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.11.
132 Id. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207. The court conceded that the Act potentially allowed the commissioner to deny relief because the statute did not explicitly require
the insurance commissioner to grant rate relief to insurers denied an adequate return. Id. The court also acknowledged that because the rate application process
was fairly complex, timely rate relief might be elusive. Id. Concurring Justice Garibaldi reiterated these concerns. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
133 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207. Several commentators have examined the nexus between due process and takings jurisprudence. See also Strong,
supra note 3, at 593, (whether a taking has occurred turns on application of due
process analysis); Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 161214 (1988) (analyzing implications ofJustice Scalia's proposition that takings claims
125
126
127
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justice explained that because the Reform Act empowered the
Commissioner of Insurance to impart rate relief to avoid a confiscatory taking, the Act was not arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious.131

Justice Handler also indicated that because the Act had

a rational relation to the legislative objective, the statutory
35
scheme satisfied substantive due process requirements.
Justice Handler tersely dismissed two additional constitutional claims addressed in the lower courts, and held that the Act
did not violate the Contract Clause 36 and was not a bill of attainder. 3 7 Appraising the relationship between the insurers and the
JUA, Justice Handler declared that no contractual relationship
existed and therefore no contract was violated. 3 8 Additionally,
may trigger more rigorous judicial scrutiny than mere economic due process
claims); see also supra note 3 for discussion of the evolution of takings jurisprudence.
134 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207 (citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502, 525 (1934)).
135 Id. The legislative objectives of the Reform Act included reducing auto insurance rates, abolishing theJUA, and establishing a means of paying of theJUA debt.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:33B-1 (West Supp. 1991); see also supra note 26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Act's purpose.
136 Id. at 64, 590 A.2d at 207. The Contract Clause provided, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o State shall.., pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
The Contract Clause was designed to prevent states from passing laws, particularly debtor relief legislation, that would interfere with the private contractual obligations of citizens. NOWAK, supra note 2, at 461-62. This clause, however, does not
impede a state's autonomy to alter contracts involving the state's inherent police
powers. Id. at 461.
The importance of the Contract Clause diminished during the "due process
era" of the early twentieth century. Id. at 467. In 1978, however, the Supreme
Court revived the Contract Clause in Allied Structural Steel Co.v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978) (Court recognized that legislation reasonably and narrowly aimed
at protecting a basic societal interest would be sustained and therefore invalidated a
Minnesota law that failed to satisfy the reasonableness and narrowness criteria of
the Contract Clause).
137 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 65, 590 A.2d at 208. The Constitution simply proclaimed that "[n]o State . . . pass any Bill of Attainder" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Historically, a bill of attainder was a legislative act that mandated the death
penalty for serious crimes without providing standard judicial proceedings. NoWAK, supra note 2, at 478-80. The prohibition against bills of attainder precluded
legislation intended to punish specifically named individuals or readily identifiable
entities without a proper trial. Id.
The bill of attainder clause has also been credited with safeguarding the separation of powers by preventing legislatures from making laws addressing specific
individuals. TRIBE, supra note 2 § 10-5, at 491-92. Professor Tribe noted: "By restricting the legislative process to the formulation of general rules, the bill of attainder clauses would guarantee an institutional fractionalization of power." Id.; see also
infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text for the court's analysis of the insurers'
bill if attainder claims in State Farm.
138 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 64, 590 A.2d at 208. The court observed that the insur-
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Justice Handler argued that the contracts clause is not a wooden
provision, and when applied, it must be applied flexibly.' 39 The
justice concluded that even if, arguendo, a contractual relationship
could be established, the impairment of an existing contract
under these circumstances would nonetheless be warranted
based on the Reform Act's substantial and legitimate public
purpose. 4 0
Adjudicating the bill of attainder claim, Justice Handler delineated the traditional characteristics of bills of attainder' 4 ' and
found that none existed in the Reform Act.' 4 2 Finally, Justice
Handler declined ruling on several peripheral claims that had
14 3
been raised, but not fully developed, in the lower courts.
ance industry, like other highly regulated industries, may make use of a "potentially
transient" regulatory scheme such as the JUA without assuming liability for the
unjustified reliance of industry participants. Id. at 64-65, 590 A.2d at 208.
139 Id. at 64, 590 A.2d at 208 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438
U.S. 234 (1978)). In Allied StructuralSteel, the Court declared that "[t]he [Contract]
Clause is not . . . the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply. As
the Court has recognized, 'literalism in the construction of the contract clause ...
would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection.' " Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 240 (1978) (quoting W.
B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433 (1934)).
140 Id. at 65, 590 A.2d at 208. Auto insurance reform was, at this time, a top
priority of both the legislative and executive branches. Id. at 42, 590 A.2d at 196.
141 Id.at 65, 590 A.2d at 208. Justice Handler cited the United States Supreme
Court's enumeration of three characteristics of bills of attainder in Selective Service
Syst. v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984). The
Supreme Court in Selective Service required "[t]hree necessary inquiries" before
holding statute invalid as a bill of attainder: "(1) Whether the challenged statute
[fell] within the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, reasonably
[could] be said to further non-punitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the
legislative record 'evinces congressional intent to punish.' " Selective Serv., 468 U.S.
at.852 (1984) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473,
475-76, 478 (1977)).
142 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 65-66, 590 A.2d at 208-09. Justice Handler noted that
of the traditional forms of legislative punishments ("death sentences, imprisonment, banishment, confiscation of property, and barring the attainted properties
from specified employment or vocations"), the only category conceivably applicable to the insurers' claims was confiscation of property. Id. at 65, 590 A.2d at 208.
Relying on antecedent confiscatory takings analysis, Justice Handler determined
that the legislation was "not a punitive confiscation." Id. Referencing the court's
preceding substantive due process scrutiny, Justice Handler averred that because
the Act addressed a legitimate and substantial legislative purpose, the Act failed to
meet the second prong of the bill of attainder test. Id.
Justice Handler also asserted that because the legislature was "clearly much
more concerned" with resolving the car insurance crisis than punishing the insurers, the Reform Act did not meet the third requirement of a bill of attainder. Id. at
65-66, 590 A.2d at 208.
143 Id. at 66, 590 A.2d at 209. These claims included assertions that the "pro-
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Justice Garibaldi, writing separately and concurring in the
judgment, stressed that the Reform Act was still vulnerable to an
as-applied challenge. 4 4 The concurring justice also expressed
misgivings about the capacity of the Insurance Commissioner to
45
provide adequate rate relief under the existing regulations.
Tempering these concerns, Justice Garibaldi opined that the regulations adopted by the Department of Insurance might prove
more serviceable than anticipated, and noted the impropriety of
prospectively arrogating the regulatory expertise of the Commis46
sioner of Insurance. 1
Justice Garibaldi added that her consternation was amplified
the
prevailing economic doldrums, 147 and emphasized the imby
48
perative that insurers be granted relief in a timely manner.
Justice Garibaldi concluded that the insolvency or extinction of
be even more devastating than
auto insurers in New Jersey 1would
49
the deplorable JUA deficit.
ducer assignment program" was violative of due process, that the Act imposed an
extraterritorial tax on mutual insurers and that the Act violated the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. Id. In refusing to review these claims, the
court noted that they could be raised in subsequent proceedings. Id.
144 Id. at 66, 590 A.2d at 209. (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 66-67, 590 A.2d at 209 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi
pointed to the complexity of the current ratemaking mechanism and opined that
the implementation of a special filing procedure would only exacerbate existing
delays. Id. at 67, 590 A.2d at 209 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi also
noted that a delay in providing relief from confiscatory rates, without more, may
not render a regulatory plan unconstitutional, but that a realistic prospect for relief
must be present. Id.; see also Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, 78 N.J. 200, 223, 394
A.2d 65, 76 (1978) (effective administrative relief mechanism was constitutionally
mandated if a regulatory scheme would have a predictable and extensive confiscatory impact); Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P. 2d 1247, 1253 (1989) (absent
adequate relief for insurers faced with confiscatory rates a provision would be
invalid).
146 State Farm, 124 N.J. at 67, 590 A.2d at 209 (Garibaldi, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 67-68, 590 A.2d at 209 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi
explained that insurance companies are no longer the "financial bulwarks" they
once were. Id. at 67, 590 A.2d at 209.
148 Id. at 67-68, 590 A.2d at 210 (Garibaldi, J., concurring). The justice reiterated that where there is a realistic possibility of adequate relief, " 'the effect of a
delay must be judged in hindsight, and it cannot be reliably predicted to amount to
constitutional interdiction.' " Id. at 68, 590 A.2d at 210 (Garibaldi, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
149 Id. at 68, 590 A.2d at 209-210 (Garibaldi,J., concurring). Justice Garibaldi's
concerns proved prophetic when Allstate Insurance Company, the largest auto insurer in New Jersey, announced its withdrawal from the New Jersey market a mere
four months after the State Farm decision. See Joe Donohue et al., Allstate is Pulling
Out as Insurer in Jersey, THE STAR-LEDGER, September 17, 1991, at 1; Eric N. Berg,
Largest Insurer in New Jersey, Allstate, Seeks to End Coverage, NEW YORK TiMES, September 17, 1991 at Al; see also Robert Schwaneberg, Regulator Calls Shaky Fiscal Position
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CONCLUSION

In State Farm v. State, the New Jersey Supreme Court judiciously deferred to a legislative pronouncement that was, at
times, nebulous and difficult to cipher. Faced with several statutory provisions apparently at loggerheads, the State Farm court
engaged the Reform Act to exhume a constitutionally viable construction. In dismissing the insurers' challenge to the new insurance scheme, the court validated an unmistakable legislative
intention to place a significant measure of the JUA debt burden
on the oft elusive shoulders of the auto insurance companies.
The State Farm court justifiably refrained from a prospective
determination of the validity of the ratemaking relief provided in
section 2g. As established in Helmsley v. Borough of Fort Lee, however, 150 a protracted and arduous administrative process, precluding timely and effective relief, may justify invalidating a
statutory scheme. 15 In State Farm, this alternative received only
cursory consideration. Given the exigency of replacing the JUA
and arresting the concomitant runaway deficit, and recognizing
that the challenge was couched as a facial attack on the statute,
the wisdom of the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision cannot
52
be questioned.
Tangible relief for New Jersey drivers, in the form of lower
insurance rates, may prove illusory. Section 2g grants insurers
the right to seek relief through a special ratemaking process, in
order to ensure a fair rate of return.'5 3 While imperative for conthe Real Reasonfor Allstate's Exit, THE STAR-LEDGER, September 23, 1991, at 1 (arguing that financial problems linked to Allstate's parent company, Sears, Roebuck and
Co. were the cause of Allstate's withdrawal, not New Jersey insurance regulations).
150 78 N.J. 200 (1978).
151 See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of Helmsley.
152 The majority alluded to the complexity of the Reform Act's rate application
process and the potential that this process might stymie realization of an adequate
rate of return. State Farm, 124 N.J. at 62, 590 A.2d at 207. Despite this caveat, the
court acknowledged the presumption of constitutionality traditionally granted legislation and assumed that the Commissioner would uphold his statutory duty to
provide rate relief in a timely fashion. Id.
Concurring Justice Garibaldi voiced concern for the timeliness of rate relief
under the Reform Act and observed that "[a]lthough the length of time before rate
relief is granted may not, alone, make the scheme constitutionally defective, the
possibility for relief from confiscatory rates must be realistic." Id. at 67, 590 A.2d at
209 (Garibaldi, J. concurring).
153 The court declined application of an emergency takings analysis, an alternative that does not appear viable, and certainly was not necessary. The court determined that it was not faced with a Helmsley type situation, and, although the
effectiveness of the relief mechanism was not a certainty, the court properly
adopted a wait-and-see approach. Id. at 63, 590 A.2d at 207.
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stitutional validity, this provision seriously undermines the Reform Act's effectiveness in making insurers accountable for
perceived abuses under the JUA. Insurers threatened with diminished profits will undoubtedly claim the rates are confiscatory; employing the statutory relief mechanism, the insurers will
pass their increased costs through to the helpless consumer. The
passthrough proscriptions in sections 75 and 78, designed to insulate New Jersey drivers from the onus of the JUA bailout, may
be reduced to mere hollow rhetoric.
Despite the questionable effectiveness of these passthrough
prohibitions, the Reform Act does erect some barriers between
the insurers and the unfettered profits earned under the previous
regime. The statutory procedures for rate-increase filings are
time-consuming and complex, and require disclosure of operating expenses and internal accounting methods. 5 4 Certain insurers, particularly those employing creative bookkeeping techniques, may opt to forego a rate-increase filing in order to avoid
making the requisite disclosures.' 5 5
Nevertheless, the Reform Act will likely be subject to numerous as-applied challenges, based on insurers' individual experiences. 156 Although the State Farm court, particularly concurring
Justice Garibaldi, expressed profound doubts as to the scheme's
serviceability, final victory for the auto insurers is not a foregone
conclusion.
Perhaps anticipating a deluge of litigation in the wake of this
decision, the State Farm court emphasized that the notion of a fair
rate of return is based on the profits earned by an efficient operation.' 5 7 Inefficient operations are not entitled to the revenue
2
154 See supra note 31 for the text of § g; see also supra note 122 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the rate increase filing process.
155 See supra note 122 for discussion of the special rate filing process; see also N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 11:3-16.11 (setting forth requirements of the filing process).
156 Disputes over accounting methods are not foreign to the auto insurance
arena. For example, when Allstate Insurance Company opted to withdraw from the
New Jersey insurance market, citing economic exigencies, a debate developed over
exactly what Allstate's profits had been. Questions arose as to proper allocation of
business expenses. Schwaneberg, supra note 149, at 1.
Additionally, a separate debate arose as to calculating the deficit incurred by
the Market Transition Facility (MTF) that succeeded the JUA but did not succeed.
See Donohue, supra note 22, at 1 (although several studies undertaken at the time
indicated that the Market Transition Facility was operating at a deficit approaching
$400 million, Insurance Department "denied any deficit exist[ed] and remained adamant in their insistence that the pool will break even by 1994.")
157 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fortunato, 248 N.J. Super. 153, 590 A.2d 690 (1991)
(insurer challenged constitutionality of order compelling the issuance of policies to
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earned by proficient businesses. This issue will surely serve as
the focal point of future litigation, and may prove the deathknell
for New Jersey auto insurers' takings claims. Insurers must be
compelled to demonstrate a heightened level of vigilance in combatting fraud, identifying false and inflated claims, and thwarting
the graft and chicanery which have pushed the industry to the eve
of destruction.
Courts must not permit inefficient enterprises to charge excessive rates to an essentially captive consumer market, merely
because these businesses lack the acumen to ferret out meritless
claims, or properly supervise their operations. Correlating the
insurers' returns to the constitutional efficiency standard will
force insurers to bear the substantial burden arising from their
own failings.
The NewJersey auto insurance industry, long plagued by the
pestilence of inefficiency, requires extensive transformation to
achieve a system where premiums are commensurate with risks
and where inefficiency is not condoned.' 5 8 When faced with asapplied challenges to the Reform Act, New Jersey courts must
insured formerly covered through theJUA); In re Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 248
N.J. Super. 153, 591 A.2d 631 (1991) (insurers filed complaint against Commissioner of Insurance for failure to take action on rate increase filings).
158 Admirably, the State of NewJersey has stepped to the forefront in combatting
fraud in its many guises, particularly in padded bills for auto body repair shops.
Herb Jaffe, Probers Say Some Body Shops Find Ways to "Pad" Repair Bills, THE STARLEDGER, October 29, 1991, at 1; Herb Jaffe, Insurance Investigations Uncover Growing
Web of Auto Shop Fraud,THE STAR-LEDGER, October 28, 1991, at 1; Herb Jaffe, Auto
Body Repair Shops Feel Sting of Fraud Probe, THE STAR-LEDGER, October 27, 1991, at 1;
see also Sue Epstein, Fortunato Stresses FraudDetection as a Way to Reduce Insurance Rates,
THE STAR-LEDGER, October 24, 1991, at 21 (detailing fraud detected in all areas of
auto insurance). The positive effect of this crackdown has already been realized,
with many unlawful operations being subject to fines and forced to obtain licenses.
Tom Hester, Sweeps Finds 143 'Illegal' Car Repair Shops in State, THE STAR-LEDGER,
March 7, 1992, at 1. Division of Insurance Fraud Prevention Director Lou Parisi
declared: "Once an unlicensed business submits to the regulatory process, we are
in a much better position to monitor that business for fraud." Id.
Other efforts aimed at remedying the ailing New Jersey auto insurance industry
include a program to identify and punish out-of-state drivers unlawfully obtaining
New Jersey insurance. Guy Sterling, 100 Paying Up, 200 Refuse as Rate Evader Fight
Heats UP, THE STAR-LEDGER, February 28, 1992, at 1; Angela Stewart, State Launches
Crackdown on Car Rate Evaders, THE STAR-LEDGER, January 3, 1992, at I; Angela
Stewart,Jersey Taking Aim at Auto Rate Evaders, THE STAR-LEDGER, January 1, 1992, at
1.
Finally, NewJersey has begun targeting uninsured drivers. Joe Donohue, State
Putting Squeeze on Uninsured Drivers, THE STAR-LEDGER, February 5, 1992, at 1. The
State has also successfully prosecuted for fraudulent claims which had increased
insurance costs exorbitantly. Joseph D. McCaffrey, 36 Cited in Big Bilk That Boosted
Cost of Jersey Insurance, THE STAR-LEDGER, April 3, 1992, at 1.
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give close scrutiny to the efficiency of the challenging insurers, to
ensure that the rate of return is commensurate with the efficiency
of their operations. It is only through identifying and addressing
the specific evils plaguing the industry, and holding the auto insurers accountable for the efficiency of their operations, that
meaningful reform will be realized.
Scott C. Shelley

